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Abstract
We present an envelope theorem for establishing ﬁrst-order conditions in decision
problems involving continuous and discrete choices. Our theorem accommodates
general dynamic programming problems, even with unbounded marginal utilit-
ies. And, unlike classical envelope theorems that focus only on diﬀerentiating value
functions, we accommodate other endogenous functions such as default probabilit-
ies and interest rates. Our main technical ingredient is how we establish the diﬀer-
entiability of a function at a point: we sandwich the function between two diﬀerenti-
able functions from above and below. Our theory is widely applicable. In unsecured
credit models, neither interest rates nor continuation values are globally diﬀeren-
tiable. Nevertheless, we establish an Euler equation involving marginal prices and
values. In adjustment cost models, we show that ﬁrst-order conditions apply uni-
versally, even if optimal policies are not (S,s). Finally, we incorporate indivisible
choices into a classic dynamic insurance analysis.
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insurance arrangements.
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 Introduction
First-order conditions are one of the most important tools for studying economic trade-
oﬀs. However, they seem inapplicable to many important markets. Our leading applic-
ation is set in Arellano’s () model of unsecured credit markets, where borrowers
choose between defaulting on their loans and honouring them.¹ e presence of this
discrete choice causes the continuation value to be a non-diﬀerentiable function of the
debt choice. But this is not the only problem. When a borrower takes on more debt, he
has a higher incentive to default in the future. is default risk will be reﬂected in the
interest rate. e borrower’s intertemporal trade-oﬀ therefore involves two endogenous
functions of debt: the interest rate and the continuation value. Both functions’ derivatives
should appear in ﬁrst-order conditions, but neither derivative exists globally.
Previous techniques are inapplicable. Existing envelope theorems,² perturbation and
variational methods do not accommodate non-diﬀerentiable interest rates. Moreover,
previous envelope theorems do not simultaneously accommodate the discrete default
choice and the Inada condition involving unbounded marginal utilities.
We present an envelope theorem that addresses these limitations. Consider an op-
timisation objective that is constructed using standard operations³ from a collection of
functions which are either known to be diﬀerentiable, or have “diﬀerentiable lower sup-
port functions” (explained below). We establish that at optimal choices, (i) this objective
is diﬀerentiable, (ii) the constituent functions are diﬀerentiable, and (iii) the ﬁrst-order
condition holds.
In our leading application of unsecured credit markets, the objective is constructed
out of a diﬀerentiable utility function and two globally non-diﬀerentiable endogenous
functions, namely the continuation value and the interest rate. Small debts trade at the
risk-free rate. But at a particular debt size – the risk-free limit – the interest rate increases
with a kink. When the borrower chooses this kink, ﬁrst-order conditions do not apply.
At any other optimal debt choice, our theorem establishes that the endogenous functions
are diﬀerentiable. e theorem also implies a ﬁrst-order condition holds: the marginal
beneﬁt of taking on debt includes the marginal interest rate, and the marginal cost is the
marginal continuation value of owing debt. is ﬁrst-order condition has been used in
¹ismodel is in the tradition of Eaton andGersovitz (). See also Bulow and Rogoﬀ (), Kehoe
and Levine (), Cole andKehoe (), Kletzer andWright (), andCooley,Marimon andQuadrini
(). Recent work includes Aguiar and Gopinath (), Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Ríos-Rull
(), Hopenhayn andWerning (), Aguiar, Amador and Gopinath (), Hatchondo andMartinez
(), Arellano andRamanarayanan (), Chatterjee and Eyigungor (), andAguiar, Amador, Farhi
and Gopinath ().
² We discuss the important envelope theorems of Mirman and Zilcha (), Benveniste and Scheink-
man (), Dechert andNishimura (), Amir,Mirman andPerkins (),Milgrom and Segal (),
and Cotter and Park () below.
³ e standard operations we consider are addition, multiplication, upper envelopes (maximum), and
function composition.
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previous work, but without establishing that the relevant derivatives exist.⁴ We provide
the missing link. is allows us to derive a new economic conclusion: while borrowers
might optimally choose to exhaust their risk-free limits, it is not optimal to exhaust their
(risky) overall limits.
Our envelope theorem involves a novel proof technique which simpliﬁes the logic
from previous envelope theorems.⁵ e main ingredient is our Diﬀerentiable Sandwich
Lemma. It establishes that any function F is diﬀerentiable at any point c where it is
sandwiched between two diﬀerentiable functions from above and below. Speciﬁcally, the
lemma applies if the two functions, which we call diﬀerentiable upper and lower support
functions U and L, satisfy (i) U(c) = F (c) = L(c), (ii) U(c)  F (c)  L(c) for all
c, and (iii) L and U are diﬀerentiable. We do not require any other conditions on F ,
such as continuity. Technically speaking, the rest of the paper is devoted to constructing
appropriate upper and lower support functions. Since our focus is on diﬀerentiability at
optimal choices, there is a straightforwardway to a construct diﬀerentiable upper support
function for any objective function: the constant function that passes through the max-
ima. For the diﬀerentiable lower support functions, we provide several generalisations
of Benveniste and Scheinkman’s () construction in our applications. With these two
constructions in hand, the Diﬀerentiable Sandwich Lemma establishes diﬀerentiability
of objective functions at optimal choices. Finally, our Reverse Calculus Lemma estab-
lishes that if an objective function is diﬀerentiable, then all of its constituent functions
(in particular the continuation value and any other endogenous function) are diﬀerenti-
able as well.
We present three additional applications. In our second application, ﬁrms have a ﬁxed
cost of adjusting their capital stock (or labour force, prices, etc.) in response to shocks.
Open questions in the literature (discussed below) are: underwhich conditions are (i) op-
timal policies two-sided (S,s), i.e. based on cut-oﬀs such that adjustment occurs only aer
suﬃciently good and suﬃciently bad shocks, (ii) such cut-oﬀs diﬀerentiable functions,
and (iii) optimal adjustments determined by ﬁrst-order conditions. Most of the literat-
ure simply assumes that these endogenous properties are satisﬁed without analysing for
whichmodel parameters this is the case.We develop a general model of adjustment costs
that nests most of the previous models.⁶ We then show that the third criterion is always
satisﬁed, regardless of the ﬁrst two criteria (on which we do not make any progress). Spe-
ciﬁcally, we show that the value function is diﬀerentiable at optimal adjustment choices,
even though it is not globally diﬀerentiable and even if the optimal adjustment policy is
⁴ As we explain below, Aguiar and Gopinath (), Hatchondo and Martinez (), and Arellano
and Ramanarayanan () discuss such a heuristic ﬁrst-order condition.
⁵e proofs of the previous envelope theorems we review are based on directional derivatives – which
may not exist (see Section ).
⁶ See Khan and omas (a), Leahy (), and Caplin and Leahy (). We will discuss in par-
ticular Bar-Ilan (), Caballero and Engel (), Cooper and Haltiwanger (), Gertler and Leahy
(), Khan andomas (b), and Elsby and Michaels ().
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not (S,s).
In the third application of our envelope theorem, villagers in an agrarian economy
insure each other against risks such as agricultural output and health shocks. Morten
() observes that in rural India, informal insurance arrangements include tempor-
ary migration to cities.⁷ Her seemingly simple extension of Ligon, omas and Wor-
rall () is complicated because the indivisible migration choice leads the households’
value functions to be neither concave nor diﬀerentiable. Nevertheless, we show that they
are diﬀerentiable at optimal choices, and the analysis of Ligon et al. () generalises in
a straightforward way. Our new economic result is that even with both continuous and
discrete choices, households perfectly insure against all shocks unless they are so big that
autarky constraints bind.is means that the lumpy migration decision is smoothed out
by reallocating the divisible consumption good.
ese applications indicate our envelope theorem is widely applicable, and is espe-
cially useful when trade-oﬀs involve endogenous functions or discrete choices. e un-
secured credit market analysis can potentially be adapted to any problem involving cut-
oﬀ policies, such as whether to accept an oﬀer or to exercise an option. For example,
in stochastic bargaining games, higher oﬀers are more likely to be accepted. Our en-
velope theorem might be used to characterise optimal oﬀers with ﬁrst-order conditions
involvingmarginal acceptance probabilities. Our theoremmight also be applied to prob-
lems involving discrete choices, such as deciding between work, study, and vacation; mi-
grating or staying; which candidate to vote for; howmany children to have; and whether
to get married.⁸
Our envelope theorem is related to several classical theorems. As our fourth applica-
tion, we provide an elementary proof of themost important envelope theorem for recurs-
ive macroeconomics, the Benveniste and Scheinkman () theorem.is theorem ap-
plies to smooth dynamic programming problems in which the value function is concave.
In fact, if the value function is not concave, then the decision maker is locally risk-loving
and can attain a strictly higher pay-oﬀ with a suitable lottery. erefore, the theorem is
applicable to dynamic programming problems that accommodate lotteries, even if the
primitives are not concave.⁹ However, the theorem only applies to value functions, but
not to other endogenous functions. eir proof involves a lemma from convex analysis.
Our proof is based on the Diﬀerentiable Sandwich Lemma. We construct the top half
of the sandwich using the supporting hyperplane theorem, and retain their construction
⁷emodel we study is in the tradition ofomas andWorrall () and Kocherlakota (), which
only have continuous choices. Other important papers in this literature include Townsend (), Attana-
sio and Ríos-Rull (), and Krueger and Perri ().
⁸ Rust () and Aguirregabiria and Mira () cite many more examples. ese are typically nu-
merical papers in the tradition of Rust (). Our theorem has been applied by Fella () and Iskhakov,
Rust and Schjerning () in the design of numerical dynamic programming algorithms.
⁹ Rogerson () studies a model in which labour is indivisible. is leads workers to play lotteries
over work obligations (or equivalently, over wealth).
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for the bottom half.
For smooth but non-convex problems, Dechert and Nishimura () supply an en-
velope theorem in the context of a growth model. Milgrom and Segal (, Corollary
) accommodate discrete choices. eir result is a special case of ours, but their proof
is based on directional derivatives which do not exist in general. ey therefore impose
superﬂuous conditions of equidiﬀerentiability and bounded derivatives which we drop
without imposing any new conditions. ese conditions are diﬃcult to meet in the pres-
ence of Inada conditions that require unbounded marginal utility.
To our knowledge, Santos () is the only envelope theorem to depart from study-
ing value functions. He provides suﬃcient conditions for the policy function to be diﬀer-
entiable via twice-diﬀerentiability of the value function. Our theorem is a more drastic
departure, as it potentially applies to any endogenous function that might need to be
diﬀerentiated in a ﬁrst-order condition.
is paper is organized as follows: Section  surveys the threats to applying ﬁrst-order
conditions. Section  presents three lemmas and our envelope theorem. In Section ,
we apply the envelope theorem to study four applications. We conclude in Section .
e appendix presents a technical discussion about the relationship of our technique to
Fréchet subderivatives.
 Threats to First-Order Conditions
is section surveys the threats to the validity of ﬁrst-order conditions through a series
of examples. All envelope theorems must either assume these threats away, or provide a
reason why they do not occur.
Some envelope theorems, such as Benveniste and Scheinkman (), have diﬃ-
culties accommodating value functions that are neither concave nor globally diﬀerenti-
able. e ﬁrst example illustrates how such value functions arise when there are discrete
choices. Suppose a worker chooses whether to work (h = 1) or relax (h = 0) based on
his savings level a. He is paid a wagew and his utility is given by u(a+wh; h). His value
of savings, depicted in Figure a, may be written as V (a) = maxh2f0;1g u(a + wh; h):
At savings level ~a, the worker is indiﬀerent between working and relaxing. At this indif-
ference point, there is a discontinuous increase in the marginal value of saving, which is
sometimes called a downward kink. is means the value function is neither diﬀerenti-
able nor concave.
e problem becomesmore severe in the ﬁnite horizon version of themodel depicted
in Figure b. e worker chooses whether to work in each period. He has many possible
sequences of discrete choices, each of which leads to a kink in the ﬁrst-period value func-
tion. In other words, kinks from tomorrow’s value function can back-propagate to kinks
in today’s value function. If any of these kinks are optimal choices, then ﬁrst-order con-
ditions will not be satisﬁed.

.V (a)
a
~a
(a) A downward kink in a value function
. a
~a
Vt
Vt 1
Vt 2
(b) Backward propagation of downward
kinks
Figure 
e proofs of all previous envelope theorems (discussed below) are based on direc-
tional derivatives. But in inﬁnite horizon problems with discrete choices, the value func-
tion’s directional derivatives may fail to exist. is possibility is illustrated abstractly in
the “bouncing ball” function depicted in Figure a, which is the upper envelope of a
countable set of parabolas.¹⁰is function has directional derivatives everywhere except
at c = 0. In particular, the right directional derivative V1(0+) does not exist because
the slope oscillates between 0 and (
p
2   1)2. To avoid this problem, previous envelope
theorems have imposed strong conditions on primitives, such as concavity or bounded
derivatives, to ensure that directional derivatives exist. However, all of these conditions
rule out studying models with discrete choices and unbounded marginal utilities of con-
sumption.
In the ﬁrst example, the value function was not diﬀerentiable because of a downward
kink. Could upward kinks, such as discontinuous jumps downwards in a marginal value,
also threaten ﬁrst-order conditions? Consider the following example where the worker
pays a progressive wage tax (wh) on his labour income wh. e tax is piecewise-linear,
with a jump at income ~I so that the aer-tax labour income,wh  (wh) has an upward
kink at ~h = ~I/w, depicted in Figure b. His value function may be written as V (a) =
maxh0 u(a + wh   (wh); h): e choice corresponding with the upward kink, ~h is
attractive in the sense that the marginal beneﬁt of working a bit beyond this level is low.
e kink is therefore an optimal labour choice at some states.¹¹is means upward kinks
are another threat to the applicability of ﬁrst-order conditions.
¹⁰ e set of parabolas is fv(; d)gd2D where
v (c; d) =   1jdj (c  d)

c  d
2

and D =
n s
2n
: s 2 f 1; 1g ; n 2 N
o
:
¹¹ But it turns out that this value function V does not inherit any kinks from the budget constraint.

.V (c)
c
(a) e bouncing ball function: an abstract
illustration of inﬁnite horizon problems
.
wh  (wh)
h
~h
(b) An upward kink in a budget constraint
Figure 
To summarise, establishing ﬁrst-order conditions requires that the relevant endogen-
ous functions be diﬀerentiable at optimal choices. Discrete choices lead to downward
kinks in value functions. In problems with multiple periods, these kinks may multiply.
In inﬁnite horizon problems, even directional derivatives may not exist. More generally,
endogenous functions might exhibit both upward and downward kinks, both of which
threaten the validity of ﬁrst-order conditions.e following section will establish condi-
tions under which all endogenous functions are diﬀerentiable at interior optimal choices.
 Envelope Theorem
is section presents amethod for verifying that ﬁrst-order conditions are satisﬁed at op-
timal choices – even when the objective includes endogenous functions. First, we present
and illustrate three lemmas which are the main steps in the method. en, we introduce
the method in the context of a simple example. Finally, we prove a theorem establishing
that this method applies to a wide class of optimisation problems.
. Diﬀerentiable Sandwich Lemma
Our ﬁrst lemma is a general tool for establishing the diﬀerentiability of functions, and
is depicted in Figure . Speciﬁcally, we establish that a function F is diﬀerentiable at c
if it is sandwiched between two diﬀerentiable functions, from above and below. Figure 
illustrates two examples of diﬀerentiable sandwiches.e second example is pathological;
the sandwiched function is discontinuous in every open neighbourhood of the sandwich
point. Nevertheless, in both examples the sandwiched functions are diﬀerentiable at the
sandwich point.

.U(c)
L(c)
c
F (c)
c
.
U(c)
L(c)
c
F (c)
c
Figure : Diﬀerentiable Sandwich Lemma
Deﬁnition . We say that F : C ! R is diﬀerentiably sandwiched between the lower
and upper support functions L;U : C ! R at c 2 C if
(i) L is a diﬀerentiable lower support function of F at c, i.e. L is diﬀerentiable, L(c) 
F (c) for all c 2 C , and L(c) = F (c), and
(ii) U is a diﬀerentiable upper support function ofF at c, i.e.U is diﬀerentiable,U(c) 
F (c) for all c 2 C , and U(c) = F (c).
Before stating the lemma,we need to be precise aboutwhat a derivative is. Sincewewould
like to accommodate many continuous choices (such as asset portfolio choices), we use
the standard multidimensional deﬁnition of diﬀerentiability. is deﬁnition is diﬀerent
from its one-dimensional counterpart to ensure that the chain rule and other calculus
identities are valid.
Deﬁnition . A functionF : C ! Rwith domainC  Rn is diﬀerentiable at c 2 int(C)
if there is some row vectorm withm> 2 Rn such that
lim
c!0
F (c+c)  F (c) mc
kck = 0: ()
m is called the derivative of F at c, and may be written as F 0(c).
In fact, this deﬁnition is almost identical to the case where the domain is a subset of a
Banach space (X; kk), and all our results and proofs in this paper generalize without
amendment, as discussed in the appendix.¹²
Lemma  (Diﬀerentiable Sandwich Lemma). If F is diﬀerentiably sandwiched between L
and U at c then F is diﬀerentiable at c with F 0(c) = L0(c) = U 0(c).
¹² In Banach spaces, the derivative m is called a “Fréchet derivative” and lies in the topological dual
space X = fm : X ! R such thatm is linear and continuousg. For our purposes, it is unnecessary to
deﬁne a topology onX because all limits are taken in (X; kk) and R.

Proof. ediﬀerence function d(c) = U(c) L(c) isminimized at c.erefore, d0(c) = 0
and we conclude L0(c) = U 0(c).
Letm = L0(c) = U 0(c). For allc,
L(c+c)  F (c) mc
kck
 F (c+c)  F (c) mckck 
U(c+c)  F (c) mc
kck : ()
Consider the limits asc! 0. Since L0(c) = U 0(c) = m, the limits of the ﬁrst and last
fractions are 0. By Gauss’ Squeeze eorem, we conclude that the limit in the middle is
also 0, and hence that F is diﬀerentiable at c with F 0(c) = m.
Remark .. e requirement that F : C ! R be globally sandwiched between L and U
on all of C can be relaxed. e function F can be restricted to any domain C 0  C such
that c 2 int(C 0). erefore, F only needs to be locally sandwiched betweenL andU for the
Diﬀerentiable Sandwich Lemma to apply.
We informally discuss the role of the support functions in the one-dimensional case. If a
function F has a lower support function L, then this rules out “upward kinks” in which
the le derivative is greater than the right derivative. Similarly, if F has an upper support
functionU , then “downward kinks” are ruled out. IfF is fully sandwiched betweenL and
U , then it has neither upward nor downward kinks, and is diﬀerentiable. Diﬀerentiable
upper and lower support functions are related to Fréchet sub- and superderivatives. We
refer to the appendix for a discussion.
e sandwich approach avoids the use of directional derivatives as they do not exist
in general (see the previous section). Previous envelope theorems imposed assumptions
such as concavity,¹³ Lipschitz continuity,¹⁴ equidiﬀerentiability,¹⁵ or supermodularity¹⁶
to ensure the existence of directional derivatives. But, these assumptions can be avoided
with our method.
. Maximum Lemma
For the Diﬀerentiable Sandwich Lemma to be useful, there must be a way to construct
diﬀerentiable upper and lower support functions. e following lemma gives a simple
construction – a horizontal line or plane – that is a diﬀerentiable upper support function
above the maximum of any function (see Figure ).
¹³Benveniste and Scheinkman ()
¹⁴Clarke ()
¹⁵Milgrom and Segal ()
¹⁶Amir et al. ()

Lemma  (Maximum Lemma). Let  : C ! R be a function. If c^ 2 int(C)maximises ,
then  has a diﬀerentiable upper support function at c^.
Proof. U(c) = (c^) has derivative U 0(c) = 0 for all c.
. c
c^
(c)
U(c)
Figure : Maximum Lemma
. Reverse Calculus
Since the construction of a diﬀerentiable upper support function is straightforward, it
might seem that establishing ﬁrst-order conditions merely involves ﬁnding a diﬀeren-
tiable lower support function. However, there is an additional diﬃculty. For example,
consider the objective (c) = F (c) + G(c), where F and G have diﬀerentiable lower
support functions f and g. At an optimal choice c^,  is diﬀerentiable because it is sand-
wiched between U(c) = (c^) and L(c) = f(c) + g(c). is establishes the ﬁrst-order
condition 0(c^) = U 0(c^) = 0. However, in most optimisation problems, such a ﬁrst-
order condition is unhelpful. Economic insights are typically obtained by expanding the
marginal objective 0 to arrive at a ﬁrst-order condition such asF 0(c^)+G0(c^) = 0. How-
ever, this expansion is not justiﬁed until we can establish F and G are diﬀerentiable at
c^.
Calculus solves the opposite problem. Calculus involves rules such as “if F and G
are diﬀerentiable at c, then H(c) = F (c) + G(c) is also diﬀerentiable at c.” We wish to
show the converse, that because (c) = F (c) +G(c) is diﬀerentiable, both F andG are
diﬀerentiable at c.
In the above simple addition problem, in factF must be diﬀerentiable at c^, becauseF
is sandwiched between f andU(c) = (c) g(c). A similar sandwich can be constructed
for G. erefore, we can indeed conclude that if c^ is an interior maximiser of , then
F 0(c^) +G0(c^) = 0:
e following lemma generalises this logic to several standard mathematical opera-
tions. It is important because we will need it to establish that all endogenous functions,
included in our ﬁrst-order conditions, are in fact diﬀerentiable.

Lemma  (Reverse Calculus). Suppose F : C ! R and G : C ! R have diﬀerentiable
lower support functions at c.
(i) IfH(c) = F (c) +G(c) is diﬀerentiable at c, then F is diﬀerentiable at c.
(ii) If H(c) = F (c)G(c) is diﬀerentiable at c and F (c) > 0 and G(c) > 0, then F is
diﬀerentiable at c.
(iii) If H(c) = max fF (c); G(c)g is diﬀerentiable at c and F (c) = H(c), then F is
diﬀerentiable at c.
(iv) If H(c) = J(F (c)) and J : R ! R are diﬀerentiable at c and F (c) respectively
with J 0(F (c)) 6= 0, then F is diﬀerentiable at c.¹⁷
Proof. Let f and g be diﬀerentiable lower support functions ofF andG at c. For (i)–(iii),
we sandwich F between f and an appropriate diﬀerentiable upper support function U
and apply the Diﬀerentiable Sandwich Lemma (Lemma ). Appropriate upper support
functions are (i) U(c) = H(c)  g(c), (ii) U(c) = H(c)/g(c), and (iii) U(c) = H(c).
For (iv),F (c) = J 1(H(c)) is diﬀerentiable at c by the inverse function theorem and
the chain rule.
ese rules have simple geometric interpretations as illustrated in Figure .e ﬁrst rule
says that if a diﬀerentiable function is the sum of two functions that have no upward
kinks, then they have no downward kinks either.
. c
F (c) +G(c)
F (c)
G(c)
(a) Addition
. c
max fF (c); G(c)g
(b) Maximum
Figure : Illustration of the Reverse Calculus Lemma
¹⁷ A generalisation is possible that accommodates J only having a diﬀerentiable lower support function.

. Illustration: Indivisible Labour
Our tools above may be applied directly to economic models to establish ﬁrst-order con-
ditions. We now present a recipe for applying them to an indivisible labour choice prob-
lem. In the next section, we show that the same recipe applies to a general class ofmodels.
e two sections can be read in parallel – as they follow the same logic – albeit in very
diﬀerent settings.
Problem. Each period, a worker chooses consumption c, savings a0 which bring a re-
turn of 0a0, and an indivisible labour supply h0 which pays a wage w. e rate of return
on savings  2 fg; bg follows a Markov process with transition probability p(0j).
We assume that the worker’s utility function u(c; h) is diﬀerentiable with respect to con-
sumption c for all labour choices h. e worker’s value function is
V (a; ) = max
c;a0;h
u(c; h) +
X
02fg ;bg
p(0j)V (a0; 0)
s.t. c+ a0 = a+ wh and h 2 f0; 1g :
()
Note that V is neither globally diﬀerentiable nor concave due to the presence of the
indivisible labour choice (see Section ). Nevertheless, we will show that V (; ) is dif-
ferentiable at optimal choices. First, it will be convenient to reformulate the worker’s ob-
jective as
(a0; a; ) = max fu(a+ w   a0; 1); u(a  a0; 0)g+
X
0
p(0j)V (a0; 0): ()
Diﬀerentiable Lower Support Functions. To apply our envelope theorem, the main
task is to construct diﬀerentiable lower support functions for the endogenous functions
V (; g) and V (; b). To this end, we use a “lazy” value function based on a construction
employed by Benveniste and Scheinkman (). Consider a lazy worker who does not
know his optimal policy functions a^00(a0; 0) and h^0(a0; 0) for all states (a0; 0). Rather, he
only knows the optimal choices for a particular state, (a0; 0), namely a00 = a^00(a0; 0) and
h0 = h^0(a0; 0). If he discovers that he is in a diﬀerent state, (a0; 0), then he is too lazy to
reconsider his choice and chooses (a00; h0). is lazy worker’s value function is
L(a0; 0; a0) = u(0a0 + wh0   a00; h0) +
X
00
p(00j0)V (a00; 00): ()
Since a0 only enters this function in the ﬁrst term in a simple way, the lazy value function
is diﬀerentiable at a0 with
L1(a
0; 0; a0) = u1(0a0 + wh0   a00; h0): ()
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First-Order Conditions. We provide three ﬁrst-order conditions, all of which hold at
the optimal choices c^ = c^(a; ) > 0 and a^0 = a^0(a; ) > 0. First, we claim that (; a; )
is diﬀerentiable at a^0 with
1(a^
0; a; ) = 0: ()
Second, we claim that then V (; g) and V (; b) are diﬀerentiable at a^0 with
u1(c^; h^(a; )) =
X
0
p(0j)V1(a^0; 0): ()
Finally, we claim that the Euler equation holds:
u1(c^; h^(a; )) =
X
0
p(0j)u1(c^0(a^0; 0); h^0(a^0; 0)): ()
e recursive ﬁrst-order condition () involves an endogenous value function,whereas
the Euler equation () does not. ese two ﬁrst-order conditions are complementary.
e ﬁrst is based on the dynamic programming notion of focusing on one trade-oﬀ at
a time, and is oen more intuitive and well-suited to numerical calculations.¹⁸ On the
other hand, in this particular example, the second ﬁrst-order condition is simpler in the
sense that it does not involve any endogenous functions. In other applications, such as the
debt application of Section ., both types of ﬁrst-order conditions include the derivative
of an endogenous function.
Proof. We show how to apply our tools to establish the results above. First, we estab-
lish the objective  is diﬀerentiable at any interior optimal choice a^0 = a^0(a; ). We
apply Lemma  by sandwiching (; a; ) between a horizontal upper support function
(Lemma ) and a diﬀerentiable lower support function based on the lazy worker con-
struction,
 (a0; a; ) = u(a+ wh^(a; )  a0; h^(a; )) +
X
0
p(0j)L(a0; 0; a^0): ()
is establishes that the ﬁrst-order condition
1(a^
0(a; ); a; ) = 0
is well-deﬁned and holds for all (a; ).
Second, we expand this ﬁrst-order condition. We must establish that V (; g) and
V (; 0b) are diﬀerentiable before including their derivatives in the ﬁrst-order conditions.
We repeatedly apply Lemma  to prove in turn that the following functions are diﬀeren-
tiable functions of a0 at a^0:
¹⁸ Fella () and Iskhakov et al. () apply our theorem to generalize the endogenous grid method
by Carroll ().
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(i) max fu(a+ w   a0; 1); u(a  a0; 0)g andP0 p(0j)V (a0; 0),
(ii) p(0 = gj)V (a0; g) and p(0 = bj)V (a0; b),
(iii) V (a0; g) and V (a0; b).
Since all of these functions are diﬀerentiable at a^0, standard rules of calculus imply the
ﬁrst-order condition ().
Finally, we establish the Euler equation (). By Lemma , the derivatives of the endo-
genous functions V (; g) and V (; b) coincide with those of their lower support func-
tions. erefore, we may substitute the derivative of the lower support functions () into
() to obtain the Euler equation.
Discussion. We are not aware of any other envelope theorem for establishing the re-
cursive ﬁrst-order condition (). Even though we established that the value functions
are diﬀerentiable at the optimal choices, they are neither globally concave nor globally
diﬀerentiable. On the other hand, the Euler equation () in this illustration can be ob-
tained without using our method. Since a^ = a^0(a; )maximises the diﬀerentiable func-
tion  (; a; ), the ﬁrst-order condition  1(c^; a; ) = 0 holds, and implies ().erefore,
the role of our envelope theorem – like other envelope theorems – is to establish ﬁrst-
order conditions involving endogenous functions.
ere are three important antecedents of our approach for one-dimensional continu-
ous choice spaces (i.e. when C = R). However, all of them make use of le and right
derivatives – which do not exist in general (see Section ) – rather than diﬀerentiable
sandwiches to prove that the value function is diﬀerentiable at optimal choices. Dechert
and Nishimura (, Corollary ) and Amir et al. (, Lemma .) supply specialized
results in the context of non-convex growth models, the latter by assuming supermodu-
larity.¹⁹ Milgrom and Segal (, Corollary ) applies more generally than these earlier
results and accommodates discrete choices without any topological or monotonicity as-
sumptions. However, as discussed in the introduction, it imposes superﬂuous require-
ments of equidiﬀerentiability and bounded derivatives to ensure that le and right deriv-
atives exist.²⁰ is impedes their theorem from being applied to dynamic programming
problems with unbounded marginal utilities.
Another approach by Morand, Reﬀett and Tarafdar () applies the envelope the-
oremofClarke () to non-convex andnon-smooth dynamic programming programs.
Similar to Clarke (), they impose local Lipschitz continuity. is paper is weakly re-
lated to our approach in that they useDini derivatives (see the appendix). All of the above
envelope theorems only apply to value functions and not to other endogenous functions.
¹⁹e supermodularity approach has recently been applied by Menzio, Shi and Sun () to a discrete
choice problem in a model of non-degenerate distribution of money holdings.
²⁰ Cotter and Park () establish an envelope theorem for smooth dynamic programming problems
with non-concave utility functions using the approach of Milgrom and Segal ().
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. Theorem
Our recipe presented above applies generally. We now show that if an objective is con-
structed out of endogenous functions using standardmathematical operations, then those
functions’ derivatives may be included in ﬁrst-order conditions provided that they have
diﬀerentiable lower support functions.
To establish this result, we must be more precise about what it means to construct a
function out of other functions. In the illustration above, the objective (; a; ) is con-
structed from the three endogenous functions a0 7!  a0, V (; G), and V (; B) using
four operations: function addition, function multiplication, function composition, and
taking the upper envelope of a set of functions. We deﬁne an envelope algebra as the set
of all functions thatmay be constructed from a set of (endogenous) functions. Our deﬁn-
ition is recursive to accommodate the idea that once we construct a function, we can use
that function to construct other functions.
Let F(C) be the set of functions with domain C and co-domain R.
Deﬁnition . We say E  F(C) is an envelope algebra if:
(i) F +G 2 E for all F;G 2 E ,
(ii) FG 2 E for all F;G 2 E with F;G : C ! R++,
(iii) H(c) = maxG2G G(c) is in E for all G  E provided it is well-deﬁned, and
(iv) J  F 2 E for all F 2 E and all diﬀerentiable J : R! R with J1 : R! R++.
Deﬁnition . e generated envelope algebra E(F) is the smallest envelope algebra gen-
erated by F  F(C) that contains F .
For our purposes, the envelope algebra consists of all of the functions we can construct
out of the endogenous functionsF . In the illustration above,F = fa0 7!  a0; V (; g); V (; b)g
and E(F) is an inﬁnite set of functions. In particular, (; a; ) 2 E(F) for all (a; ).
e following lemma establishes that if all of the endogenous functionsF have diﬀer-
entiable lower support functions, then so do all of the functions constructed out of them.
In particular, this means that the objective (; a; ) has a diﬀerentiable lower support
function.
Lemma . Let F  F(C) be a set of functions that have a diﬀerentiable lower support
function at c 2 int(C). en every F 2 E(F) has a diﬀerentiable lower support at c.
Now, we turn our attention to applying the Reverse Calculus Lemma (Lemma ). is
process begins with the knowledge that the objective  is diﬀerentiable, and proceeds
to establish that its components are also diﬀerentiable. erefore, the recursion must
proceed in the opposite direction from before. Moreover, some components may not be

locally relevant for the objective if that component is not on the upper envelope. For ex-
ample, the worker’s eﬀort choice is irrelevant if he decides to stay at home. We call the
relevant components the active envelope set.
Deﬁnition . Fix any (E ; ; c) such that E is an envelope algebra,  2 E , and c 2 C . We
deﬁne the active envelope setA(E ; ; c) as the smallest setA  E such that
(i)  2 A.
(ii) If F;G 2 E and F +G 2 A, then F;G 2 A.
(iii) If F;G 2 E and F;G : C ! R++ and FG 2 A, then F;G 2 A.
(iv) If F 2 G  E andH(c) = supG2G G(c) is inA and F (c) = H(c), then F 2 A.
(v) If J  F 2 A where J : R! R is diﬀerentiable and J1 : R! R++, then F 2 A.
Finally, we can state ourmain result. Informally speaking, the theorem says the following.
Suppose an objective function  is constructed out of functions, all of which have diﬀer-
entiable lower support functions. en, at any interior optimal choice, (i) the objective
and the relevant constituent functions are diﬀerentiable, and (ii) a ﬁrst-order condition
holds. In the illustration above, the theorem establishes that the endogenous functions
V (; g) and V (; b) are diﬀerentiable at any optimal choice a^0.
eorem  (Envelope eorem). Let F  F(C) be a set of functions that have a diﬀer-
entiable lower support function at c^ 2 int(C). If  2 E(F) and c^ 2 arg maxc2C (c),
then (i) every function in the active function set A(E(F); ; c^) is diﬀerentiable at c^, and
(ii) 1(c^) = 0.
Proof. Since  2 E(F) and the envelope algebra E(F) is generated from functions with
diﬀerentiable lower support functions at c^, Lemma  implies that  has a diﬀerentiable
lower support function at c^. Since c^maximises , Lemma  establishes that  has a diﬀer-
entiable upper support function at the maximum c^. erefore,  is sandwiched between
two diﬀerentiable functions, so Lemma  implies that it is diﬀerentiable at c^. Moreover,
0(c^) coincides with the derivative of its upper support function, which is .
We prove by induction that every function in the active set A = A(E(F); ; c^) is
diﬀerentiable at c^. We setA1 = fg. To constructAn+1, we examine eachH 2 An. For
each part of Lemma , we select appropriate functionsF andG from E(F), and conclude
that F is diﬀerentiable at c^. We do this for every possible combination of F and G, and
include each such F in An+1. We repeat this a countable number of times, and observe
thatA = [1n=1An.
Remark .. Active functions share their derivatives with their lower support functions. It
is oen easier to calculate the derivatives of endogenous functions by diﬀerentiating their
lower support functions.

eorem establishes themethod from Section . applies to a wide class of optimisation
problems. In the next section, we apply themethod to three important problems inwhich
ﬁrst-order conditions previously seemed inapplicable. While the general setting of the
theorem is quite abstract, the method itself is quite intuitive. erefore, we ﬁnd it clearer
to repeat the logic of applying the lemmas each time rather than applying the abstract
theorem.
 Applications
. Unsecured Credit
Our ﬁrst application is about unsecured debt contracts where borrowers may decide to
either repay in full or to default.We focus onmarkets without collateral such as sovereign
debt markets. e punishment for default is exclusion from the credit market thereaer.
Nevertheless, default occasionally occurs so interest paid by the borrower must com-
pensate for the default risk.²¹ For this reason, the interest charged is non-linear and de-
termined by a recursive relationship with the borrower’s value function. If the interest
rates are low, then the borrower’s value of honouring debt contracts is high because
rolling over debt is cheap. Conversely, if the borrower’s value of repaying is high tomor-
row, then the default risk today is low. is recursive relationship determines interest
rates as a function of loan size and the credit limit.
e borrower’s decision problem is poorly behaved for two related reasons. First, the
discrete repayment choice leads to jumps in the marginal value of owing debt. Second,
following marginal changes in debt, these jumps lead to kinks in the default risk and
hence kinks in the interest rate. In other words, neither the value function nor the budget
constraint are globally diﬀerentiable. Nevertheless, we apply our envelope theorem to
establish that both endogenous functions – the value function and the interest rate –
are diﬀerentiable at optimal debt choices (except for choices at the endogenous risk-free
credit limit). Hence, ﬁrst-order conditions apply and we can establish an Euler equation
involving a marginal interest rate and a marginal continuation value. We then apply our
envelope theorem to characterise the borrower’s credit limit and reach our conclusion
that the borrower never exhausts his endogenous credit limit.
We build on the unsecured credit analysis by Arellano () which is in the tradi-
tion of Eaton and Gersovitz (). Arellano carefully analyses it theoretically and nu-
merically. She also sketches a Laﬀer curve for the debt choice, but – without ﬁrst-order
conditions – does not characterise borrower behaviour along it. e following three pa-
pers apply some Euler equations, with the ﬁrst explicitly acknowledging that they lack
justiﬁcation for diﬀerentiating the interest rates with respect to loan size. We provide a
²¹ Default need not be ineﬃcient compared to risk-free debt, as it implements risk-sharing.
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justiﬁcation. Aguiar and Gopinath () dropped a detailed discussion of their heur-
istic (but now veriﬁed) Euler equation from their  working paper version. Similarly,
we verify the heuristic Euler equations that Arellano and Ramanarayanan () use to
compare maturity structures of loans. Finally, Hatchondo and Martinez () discuss
an Euler equation, implicitly assuming diﬀerentiability of interest rates. None of these
papers use ﬁrst-order conditions to investigate credit limits, nor deduce our result that
borrowers never exhaust their credit limits.
Model. Arisk-averse borrower has a diﬀerentiable utility functionu anddiscount factor
 2 (0; 1).eborrower’smarginal value of consumption at zero is inﬁnite, i.e. limc!0+ u1(c) =
1. Every period, the borrower receives an endowment x which is independently and
identically distributed with density f() on the support [xmin; xmax]. We assume the bor-
rower’s endowment is bounded away from zero, i.e. xmin > 0. To smooth out endowment
shocks, the borrower may take out loans from a lender with deep pockets. We focus our
attention on debt contracts of the following form. e borrower oﬀers to pay a lender b0
in the following period, but only promises to honour this debt obligation if the endow-
ment tomorrow, x0, lies in the set H 0. us, a debt contract consists of (b0; H 0), both of
which are chosen by the borrower. e lender is risk-neutral, discounts time at the same
rate, and is therefore willing to pay 
R
H0 f(x
0) dx0b0 in return for the promise. If the bor-
rower defaults, he is excluded from credit markets thereaer. We also accommodate an
additional exogenous sanction of s  0 units of consumption every period for default-
ing, which reﬂects the diﬃculty of settling non-ﬁnancial transactions without credit.²²
e borrower’s autarky value aer defaulting is
Waut(x) = u(x  s) + 
Z
[xmin;xmax]
Waut(x
0)f(x0)dx0: ()
e lender only agrees to the contract (b0; H 0) if the borrower has an incentive to
honour the promise for the proposed endowmentsH 0. Speciﬁcally, the borrower’s value
of repaying b0 at an honour endowment x0 2 H 0, denotedWhon(b0; x0), should not be less
²² Exogenous sanctions are oen included in unsecured credit models, so we include them to show
the generality of our technique. Without them, Bulow and Rogoﬀ () show that exclusion from credit
markets alone is an insuﬃcient punishment for enforcing debt contracts if the borrower can make private
investments.
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than the autarky valueWaut(x). e borrower’s value of honouring debts is therefore²³
Whon(b; x) = max
c;b0;H0
u(c) + 
Z
H0
Whon(b
0; x0)f(x0)dx0 + 
Z
[xmin;xmax]nH0
Waut(x
0)f(x0)dx0;
s.t. c+ b = x+


Z
H0
f(x0) dx0

b0;
Whon(b
0; x0)  Waut(x0) for all x0 2 H 0,
b0  bponzi:
()
e last constraint rules out Ponzi schemes and the bponzi parameter may be arbitrarily
large.
Reformulation. Wereformulate this problembymaking two simpliﬁcations. First, Arel-
lano (, Proposition ) established that because x is , the honour setH 0 chosen by
the borrower is determined by a cut-oﬀ rule y() so that the borrower honours his debt at
state (b0; x0) if and only if x0  y(b0). In other words, the borrower only ever chooses debt
contracts of the form (b0; H 0) = (b0; [y(b0); xmax]), so debt contracts are characterised by
b0 alone. is means we may denote the price of debt q(b0) as a function of b0. Second, it
is convenient to work with the net value functionW (b; x) = Whon(b; x) Waut(x). e
reformulated problem becomes
W (b; x) = max
b0bponzi
u(x+ q(b0)b0   b)  u(x  s) + V (b0); ()
where
V (b0) =
Z
[y(b0);xmax]
W (b0; x0)f(x0)dx0; (a)
q(b0) = [1  F (y(b0))]; (b)
y(b0) =
8><>:
xmin ifW (b0; xmin) > 0;
xmax ifW (b0; xmax) < 0;
min fx0 2 [xmin; xmax] : W (b0; x0) = 0g otherwise.
(c)
In this reformulation, the borrower’s only choice is his future debt obligation b0. We de-
note optimal policy functions by b^0(b; x).²⁴
e objective () has two endogenous functions, q and V , which we will show are
not globally diﬀerentiable. e value function has downward kinks at states of indiﬀer-
ence between honouring and defaulting, as in the value function of the indivisible labour
²³ We mention some technicalities: (i) the borrower should be constrained to choosing a measurable
honour set, and (ii) the Bellman operator is well-deﬁned for continuous value functions.
²⁴ e borrower might be indiﬀerent between several optimal policies.
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choice illustration. Moreover, we have no a priori knowledge of the diﬀerentiability of
the debt price. We will construct diﬀerentiable lower support functions for q and V and
hence show that they both do not exhibit upward kinks at any choice, with one exception:
e debt price exhibits an upward kink at the risk-free credit limit.
. b0
x0
xmax
xmin
honour
b
y()
b0
default
(a) Borrowers default when x0 < y(b0)
. b0
x0
honour
b b0
y(b0)
y(b0; b0)
default
(b) A “lazy” borrower undervalues honouring
debts, and defaults too much
Figure : e default cut-oﬀ rule
Diﬀerentiable Lower Support Functions. eproblem of constructing a diﬀerentiable
lower support function for the debt price q() is equivalent to that of constructing a dif-
ferentiable upper support function for the cut-oﬀ rule y(), illustrated in Figure a. For
debts below some threshold b, the borrower always honours his obligations, so the cut-
oﬀ y() is constant and hence diﬀerentiable on [ 1; b). At each debt level b0 > b, we
now construct a diﬀerentiable upper support function for y(). We consider a lazy bor-
rower that – as a consequence of his laziness – undervalues honouring debts, and hence
uses a higher cut-oﬀ than y(). Speciﬁcally we consider a lazy borrower who incorrectly
anticipates the state to be (b0; x0) = (b0; y(b0)), i.e. he anticipates his state will be on the
cut-oﬀ. In unanticipated states, he chooses his debt to be b^00(b0; y(b0)) independently of
the realized endowment x0. His consumption is adjusted by the diﬀerences from the an-
ticipated endowment and debt. is lazy borrower’s net value function is
L(b0; x0; b0) = u(x0   b0 + q(b00)b00)  u(x0   s) + V (b00): ()
Since the lazy borrower undervalues honouring debts, his honour cut-oﬀ y(; b0) im-
plicitly deﬁned by
L(b0; y(b0; b0); b0) = 0 ()
provides an upper support function for the cut-oﬀ y() at b0, depicted in Figure b. Since
the lazy borrower’s value function is diﬀerentiable, the implicit function theorem implies
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that y(; b0) is diﬀerentiable with y1(b0; b0) > 1 for all b0 > b.²⁵
us far, we have established that the slope of the cut-oﬀ y() is zero approaching
the risk-free limit b from the le, but greater than one approaching b from the right.
erefore, the cut-oﬀ has a downward kink at b, so it has no diﬀerentiable upper support
function at this point. is means we have established:
Lemma . At every b0 6= b, there exists a diﬀerentiable upper support function y(; b0) for
y(), and hence a diﬀerentiable lower support function q(; b0) for q(). Moreover, y() has
an downward kink at b with 0 = y0(b ) < 1 < y0(b+).
To construct a diﬀerentiable lower support function for V , we begin by constructing a
diﬀerentiable lower support function forW (b0; x0). However, this time, we use a diﬀerent
lazy borrower’s value function from the one used to construct (). is time, the lazy
borrower correctly anticipates x0, but incorrectly anticipates b0 to beb0. He takes on a debt
of b00(x0) = b^00(b0; x0) independently of his previous obligation of b0. His value function is
M(b0; x0; b0) = u(x0   b0 + q(b00(x0))b00(x0))  u(x0   s) + V (b00(x0)): ()
is means that,
V (b0; b0) =
Z xmax
y(b0;b0)
M(b0; x0; b0)f(x0) dx0 ()
is a lower support function for V at b0. We would like to establish that V (; b0) is diﬀeren-
tiable. First,M(; x0; b0) is continuously diﬀerentiable for all (x0;b0). Second, we note that
without loss of generality, wemay assume some optimal policy b^00(; ) is measurable, and
hence the resulting lazy policy b00() is also measurable.²⁶ ird, the measurability of the
lazy policy implies thatM1(b0; ; b0) is measurable for all (b0;b0). Moreover, it is possible
to show thatM1(b0; ; b0) is uniformly bounded for all b0 in some open neighbourhood of
b0. Hence the Leibniz rule for diﬀerentiating under the integral sign implies that V (; b0)
is diﬀerentiable at b0 = b0 with²⁷
V 1(b
0; b0) =
Z xmax
y(b0;b0)
M1(b
0; x0; b0)f(x0) dx0: ()
is means we have established:
Lemma . At every b0, there exists a diﬀerentiable lower support function V(; b0) for V .
²⁵ Apply the implicit function theorem on the lazy borrower’s value function to get
y1(b
0; b0) =
u1(c0(b0; y(b0)))
u1(c0(b0; y(b0)))  u1(x0   s)
> 1:
²⁶ See for example theMeasurableMaximumeorem in Aliprantis and Border (,eorem .).
²⁷ See for example Weizsäcker (, eorem .).
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First-Order Conditions. We can now return to the original problem (). If b^0 is an
optimal debt choice at the state (b; x), then it maximises
(b0; b; x) = u(x  b+ q(b0)b0)  u(x  s) + V (b0): ()
Using q(; b0) and V (; b0), we can construct a diﬀerentiable lower support for this object-
ive at any b0. By the Diﬀerentiable Sandwich Lemma (Lemma ), the borrower’s objective
is diﬀerentiable at the optimal debt choice b^0. Moreover, by repeatedly applying the Re-
verse Calculus Lemma (Lemma ), we deduce that q and V are diﬀerentiable at b^0. We
conclude:
Corollary . Suppose b^0(; ) is an optimal policy function, ﬁx any state (b; x), and set
b^0 = b^0(b; x). If b^0 6= b, then the following ﬁrst-order condition holds and the endogen-
ous functions q and V that appear in it are diﬀerentiable at b^0:
u1(c^(b; x))(q(b^
0) + q1(b^0)b^0) = V1(b^0) = 
Z xmax
y(b^0)
u1(c^(b^
0; x0))f(x0) dx0; ()
where c^(b; x) = x  b+ q(b^0(b; x))b^0(b; x).
eborrower equates themarginal beneﬁt of owing debtwith themarginal cost.emar-
ginal beneﬁt consists of the marginal utility of consumption times the marginal revenue
from promising an extra unit to the lender. e marginal cost consists of the expected
marginal utility of the foregone consumption when repaying the following period (when
the endowment shock is above the default cut-oﬀ).
.
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Figure : Characterisation of endogenous borrowing
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Credit Limits. We now turn our attention to the borrower’s behaviour near the credit
limit. e amount the lender is willing to pay, q(b0)b0 in return for a promise of b0 is not
an increasing function. is is because there are two types of empty promises: b0 = 0,
and b0 so large it is never honoured.e borrower’s return on promises therefore follows
a Laﬀer curve, depicted in Figure a. e borrower’s credit limit is the maximum of this
curve, q(b)b, where
b = arg max
b0
q(b0)b0: ()
If b > b, then we have already constructed a diﬀerentiable lower support function for
q, so the Diﬀerentiable Sandwich Lemma (Lemma ) together with the Reverse Calculus
Lemma (Lemma ) imply that q is diﬀerentiable at b with
q(b) + q1(b)b = 0: ()
Substituting this into the Euler equation (), we see that the marginal beneﬁt of taking
on debt at b is zero, while the marginal cost is positive. erefore, we conclude
Corollary . For any given model primitives, either
(i) the overall and risk-free credit limits coincide, i.e. b = b, or
(ii) the overall credit limit is higher and exhausting it is suboptimal, i.e. b > b and
b^0(b; x) < b for all states (b; x).
is conclusion is a logical generalisation of behaviour in Aiyagari’s () model. Both
here and there, the borrower reaches the risk-free credit limit with positive probability. In
the model we study, the overall credit limit is potentially higher, as the borrower has the
additional possibility of taking out risky loans. However, behaviour near the two credit
limits is strikingly diﬀerent. Below the risk-free limit, the interest rate 1/q(b0) remains
constant as the loan size q(b0)b0 increases. Above the risk-free limit, the interest rate in-
creases as the borrower takes on more debt and increases the default risk, as depicted in
Figure b.is diﬀerence accounts for why borrowersmight exhaust their risk-free limit,
but not their overall limit.
Arellano (, Figure ) plots a similar Laﬀer curve as in Figure a. Possibly for
computational reasons, her curve is smooth and does not depict the upward kink of the
Laﬀer curve at the risk-free limit, b. She does not apply ﬁrst-order conditions along the
Laﬀer curve.
Final Remarks. Despite our results regarding ﬁrst-order conditions, credit limits, and
the Laﬀer curve, some questions remain. First, we do not know if the Laﬀer curve is
single-peaked. Second, the  shock assumption was important for Arellano () to
establish that the default policy is a cut-oﬀ rule. More generally, persistent shocks cause

interest rates to depend on the shock in addition to the size of the loan, which is crucial for
understanding how credit markets operate when borrowers are distressed. Nevertheless,
we believe our analysis can be generalised. Chatterjee et al. (,eorem ) established
that persistent shocks lead to two-sided cut-oﬀ rules. We conjecture that it is possible to
construct diﬀerentiable support functions for the two cut-oﬀs, and use this to construct
a diﬀerentiable upper support function for the repayment probability. Finally, we believe
that ﬁrst-order conditions will be central to exploring extensions of the model to study
issues such as partial default and optimal term structure.
. Adjustment Costs
Firms are slow to adjust prices, labour forces, and capital stocks in reaction to changes
in market conditions. One explanation for this is that ﬁrms face adjustment costs such
as ﬁxed costs or other non-convex costs. ere is a large literature investigating how
shocks propagate in the presence of adjustment costs and whether or not adjustment
costs amplify shocks; see the surveys by Khan and omas (a), Leahy (), and
Caplin and Leahy (). However, most of this literature is purely empirical, because
the theory of adjustment costs faces two important obstacles. One is the complexity of
optimal policy functions. Both theoretical and empirical analysis has only been tractable
thus far when optimal polices involve smooth cut-oﬀ rules for determining when adjust-
ments take place.²⁸e other is the diﬃculty in deriving recursive ﬁrst-order conditions,
as the value of adjustment is not diﬀerentiable in general. Caballero and Engel ()
use shocks that enter linearly into the production function to smooth out the kinks in
the value function. Under this speciﬁc structure, they are able to take ﬁrst-conditions to
characterise optimal adjustments. To make this operational, they conjecture that adjust-
ments follow a smooth two-sided (S, s) policy, but only verify this numerically.²⁹ Gertler
and Leahy () study a quadratic approximation of the ﬁrm’s objective function in
which the non-diﬀerentiable terms in the continuation value of adjustment vanish and
optimal policies are smooth two-sided (S, s). ey establish low error bounds for this
approximation for an appropriate range of adjustment cost and shock parameters. Elsby
andMichaels () use ﬁrst-order conditions under the conjecture that the optimal ad-
justment policy is a smooth two-sided (S, s) policy, also without providing suﬃcient con-
ditions on primitives for this conjecture to hold. For the purposes of illustration, Cooper
andHaltiwanger (, Section .) andKhan andomas (b, Appendix B) provide
derivatives only in the absence of ﬁxed costs; we show these derivatives hold generally.
An alternative approach is to assume that information arrives gradually over continu-
ous time; see Harrison, Sellke and Taylor (), Stokey (), and Golosov and Lucas
²⁸Speciﬁcally, we say that a policy is a smooth two-sided (S, s) policy if (i) for every capital (or labour or
price) level, the set of shocks for which the ﬁrm makes an adjustment is an interval and (ii) the upper and
lower end points of this interval are diﬀerentiable functions of the capital level.
²⁹ Caballero and Engel (, Footnote )
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().
e fundamental problem is that if a ﬁrm invests more today, then it might defer
subsequent investment longer.us a small change in today’s choice may lead to a lumpy
change in a later choice, giving a non-diﬀerentiable and non-concave value of investment.
We show that at optimal adjustment choices, the value function is diﬀerentiable so that
recursive ﬁrst-order conditions are applicable. We require only very weak assumptions
on the primitives. In particular, our result remains true even when optimal policies are
not two-sided (S, s) (see for example Bar-Ilan, ).
Model. In a general formulation, a ﬁrm is endowed with a capital stock k and shock z.
Shocks evolve according to a Markov process with conditional distribution P (z0jz). In
each period, the ﬁrm’s ﬂow proﬁt is (k; z); for example (k; z) = pf(k; z)  rk where
p is output price, f is the production function, and r is the rental rate of capital. e
ﬁrm pays an adjustment cost c(k0; k; z); non-adjustment is costless. We assume the ﬂow
proﬁt (; z) is diﬀerentiable for all z, and that the adjustment cost c(; ; z) function is
diﬀerentiable at all points (k; k0; z) such that k0 6= k. For example, this accommodates
the pure ﬁxed-cost function, c(k0; k; z) = I(k0 6= k). e ﬁrm’s value before adjusting
its capital stock at state (k; z) is V (k; z). Its value aer adjusting its capital stock to k0 is
W (k0; z). ese two value functions are related by the following two Bellman equations:
V (k; z) = max
k0
(k; z)  c(k0; k; z) + W (k0; z); (a)
W (k0; z) =
Z
V (k0; z0) dP (z0jz): (b)
Our goal is to establish the ﬁrst-order condition for the capital choice k0
c1(k
0; k; z) = W1(k0; z) ()
and to derive a formula for the marginal value of investment W1(k0; z) at the optimal
choice k0 = k^0(k; z). If there is a ﬁxed cost of an adjustment, then this formula will only
be satisﬁed when the agent makes an adjustment, i.e. at shocks z lying in the optimal
adjustment set
A^(k) =
n
z : k^0(k; z) 6= k
o
: ()
Diﬀerentiable Lower Support Functions. We construct a diﬀerentiable lower support
function for the value function V by considering a lazy manager who knows the optimal
policy when he begins with a familiar capital stock of k = k. e obvious lazy manager
policy of sticking to the same capital choice when k 6= k is not useful here, because it
leads to a discontinuous lazy value function.³⁰ Instead, we consider a lazy manager who
³⁰is obvious lazymanagermakes an extra adjustment even if the capital stock is only slightly diﬀerent
from the familiar level.
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uses the familiar adjustment set and adjustment level for unfamiliar capital stocks, i.e. he
waits until he draws a shock z 2 A^(k) and adjusts to k^0(k; z). ereaer, his choices
coincide with the rational manager. His value function is
L(k; z; k) = (k; z) +
(

R
L(k; z0; k) dP (z0jz) if z 62 A^(k);
 c(k^0(k; z); k; z) + W (k^0(k; z); z) if z 2 A^(k): ()
It is straightforward to calculate the lazy manager’s marginal value of capital, because the
capital stock k does not aﬀect any subsequent choices:³¹
L1(k; z; k) = 1(k; z) +
(

R
L1(k; z
0; k) dP (z0jz) if z 62 A^(k);
 c2(k^0(k; z); k; z) if z 2 A^(k):
()
First-Order Conditions. If k^0 is an optimal choice at the state (k; z), then k^0maximises
(k0; k; z) = (k; z)  c(k0; k; z) + W (k0; z): ()
By substituting in () and (b), we may construct a diﬀerentiable lower support func-
tion for (; k; z) at k^0. Lemma  provides a diﬀerentiable upper support function, so
Lemma  establishes the following corollary.
Corollary . If making an adjustment is optimal at state (k; z), i.e. z 2 A^(k), then the
investment valueW is diﬀerentiable in capital at (k^0(k; z); z) and
c1(k^
0(k; z); k; z) = W1(k^0(k; z); z) = 
Z
~L1(k^
0(k; z0); z0) dP (z0jz); (a)
where ~L1(k; z) = 1(k; z) +
(

R
~L1(k; z
0) dP (z0jz) if z 62 A^(k);
 c2(k^0(k; z); k; z) if z 2 A^(k):
(b)
e ﬁrst equation says that themarginal adjustment cost should equal themarginal value
of investment, which is the same for both rational and lazy managers. e second equa-
tion says that the marginal value of increasing investment equals the expected marginal
increase in proﬁt until the next adjustment plus the marginal decrease in the subsequent
adjustment cost. We have thus shown that ﬁrst-order conditions are generally valid even
if the optimal adjustment policies are not (S,s). In other words, we have established that
the applicability of ﬁrst-order conditions is not an obstacle to the theoretical analysis of
the implications of adjustment costs to prices, labour forces, and capital stocks. e only
remaining obstacle is understanding when optimal policies are (S,s).
³¹ e lazy manager’s marginal value follows from the chain rule applied to (i) the expected discounted
proﬁt as a function of all state-contingent capital choices, holding adjustment times ﬁxed, and (ii) the lazy
capital choices as a function of initial capital k only.
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. Social Insurance
Governments run public health, unemployment and disability insurance programs, and
private companies oﬀer insurance contracts. ese are constrained by frictions such as
hidden information, adverse selection, andmoral hazard. Informal insurance ariseswithin
well-connected families and communities when they can partially overcome these fric-
tions. ere is a large literature studying informal insurance, and the interaction of in-
formal insurance with other forms of insurance.³² In the dynamic insurance models of
omas andWorrall (, ) and Kocherlakota (), the main issue is how cross-
subsidisationmay be self-enforcing. Agents with good luck subsidise those with bad luck
in return for promises of future payments and insurance.ese papers study smooth con-
vex environments in which the Benveniste and Scheinkman () theorem provides a
formula for themarginal cost ofmaking promises.³³ However, some important insurance
problems involve non-smooth settings. We focus on a setting similar to that of Morten
(), which is an extension of Ligon et al.’s () model of self-enforcing dynamic
insurance. Villagers share risk among themselves by both sharing divisible output and
sending some members of the community to ﬁnd temporary work in cities.e tempor-
ary migration decisions are inherently discrete as they involve a ﬁxed cost of moving to
the city and back. Other examples of indivisible items in village economies include live-
stock, medical treatments, agricultural land (due to high legal costs), and houses. is
environment is non-smooth and non-concave, so the marginal cost of promises does not
exist globally. Nevertheless, our envelope theorem applies and allows us to characterise
optimal insurance policies in terms of the marginal cost of promises. Optimal policies
involve sharing risk through allocating indivisible temporary work obligations; divisible
consumption is then allocated to smooth out the marginal utility of consumption across
states.
Model. Consider the following dynamic risk-sharing game between two households
h 2 f1; 2g. Each period begins with a Markov shock s 2 S with transition function
p(s0js). e shock determines each household’s endowment of a divisible consumption
good, Ch(s). e aggregate endowment is C(s) = C1(s) + C2(s). In addition, each
household may produce M units of the consumption good from temporary migrant
work in a city. We write dh = 1 if the household migrates, and dh = 0 otherwise. We
assume that the utility from consumption u(; dh) is diﬀerentiable, and that the marginal
utility approaches inﬁnity as consumption approaches zero. e autarky value of each
³² Apart from the papers we discuss, Townsend (), Attanasio and Ríos-Rull (), and Krueger
and Perri () are important papers.
³³ Kocherlakota () mistakenly claims his value function is diﬀerentiable. Koeppl () amends his
Bellman equation along the lines of omas and Worrall (). See also Ljungqvist and Sargent (,
Chapter ), and Rincón-Zapatero and Santos (, Section .) for further discussion.
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household is
V auth (s) = max
dh
u(Ch(s) +Mdh; dh) + 
X
s0
p(s0js)V auth (s0): ()
Before investigating the social insurance arrangements with autarky constraints, we
present the social planner’s problem with Negishi weights 1 and 2:
W (s) =max
c1;d1
1u(c1; d1) + 2u(c2; d2) + 
X
s02S
p(s0js)W (s0) (a)
where c1(s) + c2(s) = C(S) + (d1 + d2)M: (b)
e ﬁrst-order condition with respect to c1 gives the Borch () equation
u1(c1; d1)
u1(c2; d2)
=
2
1
: ()
is means that aer the social planner allocates the migration decisions, she adjusts the
consumption good until the planner’s marginal rate of substitution between the house-
holds is equal to the ratio of Negishi weights at all states and dates.
Now, we add in autarky constraints to study the optimal incentive-compatible social
insurance contract. e value function for household  can be formulated recursively in
terms of a principal-agent problem in which household  acts as an insurer and is able
to promise future utility to household . is promised utility is a state variable, and has
a corresponding promise-keeping constraint. Both households can leave the contract at
any time, so there is an autarky constraint for each of them.
V (s; v2) = max
c1;d1;d2;v02(s0)
u(c1; d1) + 
X
s02S
p(s0js)V (s0; v02(s0))
s.t. (PK₂) u(c2; d2) + 
X
s02S
p(s0js)v02(s0) = v2;
(A₁-s0) V (s0; v02(s
0))  V aut1 (s0) for all s0 2 S,
(A₂-s0) v02(s
0)  V aut2 (s0) for all s0 2 S,
()
where c2 = C(s) + (d1 + d2)M   c1:
Diﬀerentiable Lower Support Functions. We construct a lower support function of V
using the lazy insurer’s value function as follows. At a familiar promised utility v2, the
lazy insurer knows the optimal migration allocation and future promised utilities, which
we denote d1 and v02(). e lazy insurer makes these familiar choices even at unfamiliar
promised utilities v2 6= v2, and only adjusts consumption of the consumption good c1

in order to satisfy the promise-keeping constraint (PK₂). us, the lazy insurer’s value
function is
L(s; v2) = u(c1(v
0
2);
d1) + 
X
s0
p(s0js)V (s0; v02(s0)); ()
where c1(v02) is deﬁned implicitly by (PK₂).e lazy insurer’smarginal value of promising
utility v2 to the other household is
Lv2(s; v2) = u1(c1(v
0
2);
d1)
dc1(v
0
2)
dv2
=  u1(c1;
d1)
u1(c2; d2)
; ()
where dc1/dv2 was calculated with the implicit function theorem.
First-Order Conditions. It is tempting to apply our envelope theorem to the choices
of all promised utilities v02(). However, some of these choices may be boundary choices,
i.e. at some states s0, one of the autarky constraints (A₁-s0) or (A₂-s0) may bind. Tech-
nically speaking, if any choice is on the boundary, then the choice vector is a boundary
choice. Our solution is to focus on interior choices by considering each choice separately.
Suppose (d^1; v^02()) are optimal choices at state s. If v^02(s0) is an interior optimal choice
at state s0, then this choice maximises
(v02; d^1; s
0) = u(c1(v02); d^1) + p(s
0js)V (s0; v02); ()
where c1() is the same function deﬁned above in terms of the promise-keeping con-
straint (PK₂). Notice that the terms for the other future states were dropped, as they are
unaﬀected by the choice of v02. We may now apply the logic from Section . (which is
summarised ineorem ).
Corollary . Fix some state s0, and suppose that
(i) (c^1; c^2; d^1; d^2; v^02()) are optimal choices at (s; v2),
(ii) no autarky constraints bind for the choice of v^02(s
0) for state s0, and
(iii) (c^01; c^
0
2; d^1; d^2)) are optimal choices at (s
0; v^02(s
0)).
en the value function V (s0; ) is diﬀerentiable at v^02(s0) with
  u1(c^1; d^1)
u1(c^2; d^2)
= Vv2(s
0; v^02(s
0)) =  u1(c^
0
1; d^
0
1)
u1(c^02; d^
0
2)
: ()
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Discussion. is equation is the Borch () equation which characterises perfect in-
surance – the social planner’s marginal rate of substitution is equated across states and
time periods.is means we have shown that with both divisible and indivisible choices,
there is perfect insurance between households at all states and times forwhich the autarky
constraints are lax. When an autarky constraint binds, the Negishi weights are adjusted
and perfect insurance continues until an autarky constraint binds in the future.is gen-
eralises the conclusion drawn byomas andWorrall ()when indivisible choices are
absent.
. Benveniste-Scheinkman Envelope Theorem
Our approach leads to an elementary proof of the Benveniste and Scheinkman ()
envelope theorem.is theorem establishes global diﬀerentiability of the value function
in convex settings (without any discrete choices).
Problem . Consider the following dynamic programming problem:
V (c) = sup
c02fc0:(c;c0)2 g
u(c; c0) + V (c0); ()
where the domain of V is C . We assume that (i)   is a convex subset of C  C , (ii) u is
concave, and (iii) u(; c0) and u(c; ) are diﬀerentiable, respectively.
Corollary  (Benveniste-Scheinkman eorem). If c^0 is an optimal choice at state c 2
int(fc : (c; c^0) 2  g), then V is diﬀerentiable at c with V1(c) = u1(c; c^0):
Proof. V is concave because u is concave and   is convex. Hence, the supporting hyper-
plane theorem can be applied to the hypograph of V to construct a linear upper support
function U that touches V at c. We construct the diﬀerentiable lower support function
L(c) = u(c; c^0) + V (c^0). Lemma  delivers the conclusions.
e Diﬀerentiable Sandwich Lemma in our proof plays a similar role as Rockafellar
(,eorem .) in the original proof of Benveniste and Scheinkman ().³⁴ Con-
cavity implies the existence of a diﬀerentiable upper support function andBenveniste and
Scheinkman use a lazy agent’s value function as a diﬀerentiable lower support function.
Mirman and Zilcha (, Lemma ) provide a one-dimensional antecedent based on
directional derivatives rather than the sandwich approach.
³⁴ We show that Rockafellar’s result contains a superﬂuous concavity assumption; the lower support
function in the sandwich need not be concave.

 Conclusion
All envelope theorems have a sandwich idea at their core. Previous proofswere structured
around sandwiches of inequalities of directional derivatives. By restructuring around
sandwiches of diﬀerentiable upper and lower support functions, we gain two things. First,
we do not require any of the strong technical conditions from previous envelope theor-
ems, and can accommodate primitives with Inada conditions. Second and more import-
antly, our approach potentially applies to any type of endogenous functions that might
need to be diﬀerentiated in a ﬁrst-order condition.
Our method gains us a straightforward way of mixing and matching diﬀerent con-
structions of upper and lower halves of sandwiches.We used ﬁve constructions through-
out, namely (i) horizontal lines above maxima, (ii) supporting hyperplanes above con-
cave functions, (iii) reverse calculus, (iv) lazy value functions below rational value func-
tions, and (v) lazy cut-oﬀ rules. Of these, only the reverse calculus construction is truly
unprecedented. e power of our approach derives from the ability to combine these
constructions. For example, the unsecured credit application uses all but the support-
ing hyperplane construction. ere are also other possibilities that we did not explore.
Decision makers can be “lazy” in ways that lead to upper support functions, such as be-
ing lazily optimistic about future opportunities. In bargaining games, a lower support
function for one player’s value function leads to an upper support function for the other
player’s value function.
To conclude, our newapproach reveals that trade-oﬀswhich previously seemedpoorly
behaved in fact have smooth structures within them that lead to ﬁrst-order characterisa-
tions of optimal decisions.
A Support Functions and Subdiﬀerentials
e notion of a diﬀerentiable lower support function generalises the classic ideas from
convex analysis of supporting hyperplanes and subdiﬀerentials. In this appendix, we es-
tablish a tight equivalence between diﬀerentiable lower support functions and Fréchet
subdiﬀerentials.ese were once seen as a promising way to generalise the classical tech-
niques of convex optimisation described by Rockafellar () beyond convex settings.
However, according to Kruger (), these were abandoned because of “rather poor
calculus” as Fréchet subdiﬀerentials do not sum, i.e. @F (f + g)(x) 6= @Ff(x) + @Fg(x).
In light of our developments, we believe that Fréchet subdiﬀerentials may have other
applications to optimisation theory.
Suppose (X; kk) is a Banach space and C  X .
Deﬁnition . A function f : C ! R is Fréchet subdiﬀerentiable at c if there is some

m 2 C such that
lim inf
c!0
f(c+c)  f(c) mc
kck  0: ()
Such an m is called a Fréchet subderivative of f at c, and the set of all subderivatives is
called the Fréchet subdiﬀerential of f at c, denoted @Ff(c). Deﬁnitions for Fréchet super-
diﬀerentiable, superderivatives, and superdiﬀerentials are analogous.
eorem . m is a Fréchet subderivative of f : C ! R at c if and only if f has a
diﬀerentiable lower support function L at c such that L1(c) = m.
Proof. If L is such a diﬀerentiable lower support function, then L1(c) = m, i.e.
lim
c!0
L(c+c)  f(c) mc
kck = 0: ()
Since f(c+c)  L(c+c) for allc, it follows that
lim inf
c!0
f(c+c)  f(c) mc
kck  0 ()
and hencem is a Fréchet subderivative of f at c.
Conversely, suppose thatm is a subderivative of f at c. We claim that
L(c) = min ff(c); f(c) +m(c  c)g ()
is a diﬀerentiable lower support function of f at c. By construction, L is a lower support
function. Moreover, the function U(c) = f(c)+m(c  c) is a diﬀerentiable upper sup-
port function of L at c; by the ﬁrst part of the theorem, U1(c) = m is a superderivative
of L at c. On the other side,m is a subderivative of L at c because
lim inf
c!0
L(c+c)  f(c) mc
kck
= min

0; lim inf
c!0
f(c+c)  f(c) mc
kck

()
 0:
erefore, L is diﬀerentiable at c with L1(c) = m.
Lemma  then becomes a classic result.
Lemma . Ifm is a Fréchet subderivative of f : C ! R at c andM is a superderivative
of f at c, then f is diﬀerentiable at c with f 0(c) = m = M.

References
A, M., A, M., F, E. and G, G. (). Crisis and commitment: Inﬂation credib-
ility and the vulnerability to sovereign debt crises, mimeo.
—, — and G, G. (). Investment cycles and sovereign debt overhang. Review of Economic
Studies,  (), –.
— and G, G. (). Defaultable debt, interest rates and the current account. Journal of Interna-
tional Economics,  (), –.
A, V. andM, P. (). Dynamic discrete choice structural models: A survey. Journal of
Econometrics,  (), –.
A, S. R. (). Uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate saving.Quarterly Journal of Economics,
 (), –.
A, C. D. and B, K. C. (). Inﬁnite Dimensional Analysis. Springer Verlag,  edn.
A, R., M, L. J. and P, W. R. (). One-sector nonclassical optimal growth: Optimality
conditions and comparative dynamics. International Economic Review,  (), –.
A, C. (). Default risk and income ﬂuctuations in emerging economies. American Economic
Review,  (), –.
— and R, A. (). Default and the maturity structure in sovereign bonds. Journal of
Political Economy,  (), –.
A, O. and R-R, J.-V. (). Consumption smoothing in island economies: Can public
insurance reduce welfare? European Economic Review,  (), –.
B-I, A. (). Trigger-target rules need not be optimal with ﬁxed adjustment costs: A simple com-
ment on optimal money holding under uncertainty. International Economic Review,  (), –.
B, L.M. and S, J. A. (). On the diﬀerentiability of the value function in dynamic
models of economics. Econometrica,  (), –.
B, K. (). Equilibrium in a reinsurance market. Econometrica,  (), –.
B, J. andR, K. (). Sovereign debt: Is to forgive to forget?American Economic Review,  (),
–.
C, R. J. and E, E. M. R. A. (). Explaining investment dynamics in U.S. manufacturing:
A generalized (S,s) approach. Econometrica,  (), –.
C, A. and L, J. (). Economic theory and the world of practice: A celebration of the (S, s)
model. Journal of Economic Perspectives,  (), –.
C, C. D. ().emethod of endogenous gridpoints for solving dynamic stochastic optimization
problems. Economics Letters,  (), –.
C, S., C, D., N, M. and R-R, J.-V. (). A quantitative theory of unse-
cured consumer credit with risk of default. Econometrica,  (), –.
— and E, B. (). Maturity, indebtedness, and default risk. American Economic Review,
 (), –.
C, F. H. (). Generalized gradients and applications. Transactions ofe AmericanMathematical
Society, , –.
C, H. L. and K, T. J. (). Self-fulﬁlling debt crises. Review of Economic Studies,  (), –.
C, T., M, R. and Q, V. (). Aggregate consequences of limited contract enforce-
ability. Journal of Political Economy,  (), –.

C, R. W. and H, J. C. (). On the nature of capital adjustment cost. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, , –.
C, K. D. and P, J.-H. (). Non-concave dynamic programming. Economics Letters,  (),
–.
D, W. D. and N, K. (). A complete characterization of optimal growth paths in an
aggregated model with a non-concave production function. Journal of Economic eory,  (), –
.
E, J. and G, M. (). Debt with potential repudiation:eoretical and empirical analysis.
Review of Economic Studies,  (), –.
E, M. and M, R. (). Fixed adjustment costs and aggregate ﬂuctuations, mimeo.
F, G. (). A generalized endogenous grid method for non-concave problems. Review of Economic
Dynamics, forthcoming.
G, M. and L, J. (). A Phillips curve with an Ss foundation. Journal of Political Economy,
 (), –.
G,M. andL, R. E. ().Menu costs andPhillips curves. Journal of Political Economy,  (),
–.
H, J.M., S, T.M. andT,A. J. (). Impulse control of brownianmotion.Mathematics
of Operations Research, , –.
H, J. C. and M, L. (). Long-duration bonds and sovereign defaults. Journal of In-
ternational Economics,  (), –.
H, H. and W, I. (). Equilibrium default, mimeo.
I, F., R, J. and S, B. (). A generalized endogenous grid method for discrete-
continuous choice, mimeo.
K, T. J. and L, D. K. (). Debt-constrained asset markets. Review of Economic Studies,  (),
–.
K, A. and T, J. K. (a). Adjustment costs. In S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume (eds.),e New
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
— and — (b). Idiosyncratic shocks and the role of nonconvexities in plant and aggregate investment
dynamics. Econometrica,  (), –.
K, K. M. and W, B. D. (). Sovereign debt as intertemporal barter. American Economic
Review,  (), –.
K, N. R. (). Implications of eﬃcient risk sharing without commitment. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies,  (), –.
K, T. V. (). Diﬀerentiability of the eﬃcient frontier when commitment to risk sharing is limited.
B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics,  (), –.
K, D. and P, F. (). Does income inequality lead to consumption inequality: Evidence and
theory. Review of Economic Studies, , –.
K, A. Y. (). On Fréchet subdiﬀerentials. Journal of Mathematical Sciences, , –.
L, J. (). s-S models. In S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume (eds.), e New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
L, E., T, J. P. and W, T. (). Informal insurance arrangements with limited com-
mitment: eory and evidence from village economies. Review of Economic Studies,  (), –.
L, L. and S, T. J. (). Recursive Macroeconomic eory. MIT Press, ⁿ edn.

M, G., S, S. and S, H. (). A monetary theory with non-degenerate distributions. Journal of
Economic eory, forthcoming.
M, P. and S, I. (). Envelope theorems for arbitrary choice sets. Econometrica,  (), –
.
M, L. J. and Z, I. (). On optimal growth under uncertainty. Journal of Economic eory,
 (), –.
M, O. F., R, K. L. and T, S. (). A generalized approach to envelope theorems,
mimeo.
M, M. (). Temporary migration and endogenous risk sharing in village India, mimeo.
R-Z, J. P. and S, M. S. (). Diﬀerentiability of the value function without interi-
ority assumptions. Journal of Economic eory,  (), –.
R, R. T. (). Convex Analysis. Princeton University Press.
R, R. (). Indivisible labor, lotteries and equilibrium. Journal of Monetary Economics,  (),
–.
R, J. (). Optimal replacement of  bus engines: An empirical model of Harold Zurcher. Econo-
metrica,  (), –.
— (). Dynamic programming. In S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume (eds.), New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
S, M. S. (). Smoothness of the policy function in discrete time economic models. Econometrica,
 (), –.
S, N. L. ().e Economics of Inaction: Stochastic Control models with ﬁxed costs. Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
T, J. and W, T. (). Self-enforcing wage contracts. Review of Economic Studies,  (),
–.
— and — (). Income ﬂuctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-
agent problem. Journal of Economic eory,  (), –.
T, R. M. (). Risk and insurance in village India. Econometrica,  (), –.
W, H. . (). Basic measure theory, lecture notes.

